The Middle East

Shifting balance of power and persistent threat of escalation
The regional balance of power in the Middle East changed after the 12-day war between Israel and Iran in the summer of 2025. Israel has strengthened its position at the expense of Iran and the Iran-led axis of resistance, consisting of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Shia militia groups in Iraq and the Houthi movement in Yemen, among others. Iran was already marked by two years of Israeli military pressure, but after the 12-day war, the country’s nuclear programme and military capability have both become diminished, and hence also Tehran’s deterrent. Nevertheless, Israel sees Iran’s nuclear programme, missile arsenal and allied groups as a threat, and the risk of renewed escalation in the region persists.

There are still skirmishes between Israel and Hamas, in spite of the ceasefire agreement. The US peace plan is supported by a UN resolution, but neither Israel nor Hamas have committed to the plan in its entirety. Israel will seek to prevent the agreement from enabling the formation of a Palestinian state, while Hamas will not accept full disarmament. A Hamas that remains militarily capable would be a target of new Israeli attacks and jeopardise humanitarian assistance in Gaza. 

Following the ceasefire in Gaza, the Houthi movement halted its attack campaign against Israel and shipping linked to the country. The movement will likely resume the campaign in the event of renewed escalation in Gaza, or if Israel carries out large-scale attacks in Yemen. Although any new attack campaign would be aimed primarily at Israeli interests, it would also represent a renewed threat to Norwegian and other shipping in the region. In addition, it would cause disruptions in global supply chains and markets.

In Lebanon, the November 2024 ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah is strained. Without clear steps towards a disarmament of Hezbollah, there is an increased likelihood of a wider Israeli occupation in Lebanon and intensified Israeli air operations against Hezbollah targets. This would challenge the Lebanese army’s ability to counter a military escalation between Israel and Hezbollah; the Lebanese army plays a key role in disarming Hezbollah.

Normalisation processes have stalled
The level of conflict in the region has put regional normalisation and de‑escalation processes on hold. Israel’s warfighting in Lebanon and Gaza has made it harder for the Arab countries to normalise relations with Israel. It is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will implement the normalisation plan until Israel makes concessions on Palestinian self‑rule in both Gaza and the West Bank.

The Gulf states will continue to develop their security cooperation with the United States, but at the same time they are seeking to increase their scope for action by strengthening ties with Russia and China. Consequently, they could become more receptive to Russian and Chinese positions on Ukraine and Taiwan in multilateral forums. In addition, great power rivalry could spill over to the Persian Gulf, resulting in the involvement of all three great powers – the United States, Russia and China.

Russia’s influence in the Middle East has become considerably weaker following the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria in December 2024. Russia pulled out most of its forces after the regime’s fall, but has retained two bases on the coast. Moscow is now looking to strike a deal with Damascus to maintain a Russian military presence in the Mediterranean and have a hub for operations in Africa.

Iran-Israel conflict could trigger broad regional destabilisation
The protests in early 2026 are the most serious that the Iranian authorities have had to face. They posed a significant threat to the stability of a regime that was already at risk. Tehran perceives the risk of new attacks from Israel and aggressive rhetoric from the US as imminent threats, and sees that its worst-case scenario – being embroiled in conflict both externally and internally – could become a reality.

Iran therefore needs to restore its deterrent capability vis-à-vis Israel and the United States. In order to achieve this, Tehran prioritises rebuilding its missile programme. Rebuilding its nuclear programme and its regional network of non-state actors carries a greater risk of fresh attacks from Israel. Iran seeks to find a balance between restoring its deterrent and not provoking a new military conflict, one which could involve the United States.

In the event of a new round of military escalation, it is likely that Iran would threaten to attack shipping traffic in the region.

With Iran lacking a deterrent against Israel in the region, Tehran’s ability to attack Israeli and Jewish targets elsewhere in the world becomes more important. A series of attack plots in recent years show that Tehran views Scandinavia and the rest of Europe as legitimate and potential targets for such operations.
 

Iran retains ability to develop nuclear weapons
Iran’s enrichment infrastructure has been destroyed as a result of the 12-day war in June. However, Iran still has the technological expertise needed to make nuclear weapons, and likely still has access to highly enriched uranium. It is technically possible to rebuild enrichment capacity sufficient for nuclear weapons production within months. In a situation where Tehran perceives the regime’s survival as threatened, it may view nuclear weapons as the only option for deterring the United States and Israel.

In any event, rebuilding missile production capacity is a priority. Iran still possesses a large arsenal of missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads that can reach the entire Middle East and large parts of Europe.