Russia and China in the Arctic

It is in Russia’s interest that the Greenland debate causes uncertainty and potential conflict between Europe and the United States. Moscow may also come to exploit the situation in its own narrative, in which it claims that it is legitimate for great powers to impose their will on smaller states.

Beijing views all disagreement and uncertainty in the transatlantic partnership as an opportunity to increase Chinese scope for action vis-à-vis Europe.

Security policy developments could affect Moscow’s need for control
The Russian Arctic remains important, both to the Kremlin’s military and economic ambitions and for Russian deterrence. National development projects, such as investments in the Barents Sea region and along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), are intended to bolster Russian presence and activity in the region.

While war is raging in Ukraine, the Kremlin has sought to keep the Arctic apart from its confrontation with the West. However, the regime still believes that conflicting interests between itself and other actors could cause the situation to deteriorate and threaten Russian interests.

NATO maintains a routine presence in areas close to Norway, and Russia will continue accusing Norway of facilitating Western militarisation of the Arctic. If Russia comes to perceive its own freedom of action in the region to be under threat, the result may be more self-assertive behaviour towards the West. This could take the form of more offensive conduct by Russian forces.

Svalbard policy shaped by distrust and ambition
Growing distrust of allied ambitions has also sharpened Moscow’s rhetoric concerning Norwegian Svalbard policy. Russia will remain intent on preventing NATO from making military use of the archipelago. From Moscow’s perspective, Svalbard’s strategic location makes it necessary to maintain a Russian presence there.

There are signs that the Kremlin is looking to make the Barentsburg settlement less dependent on Norwegian supply and transport infrastructure. Regular port visits by ships from Russia constitute one planned step in this direction. As before, the grounds for the Russian presence in Svalbard will primarily continue to be coal mining, tourism and research.

Russian development ambitions scaled back
Russia is nowhere near meeting its development targets in the Russian Arctic, and its ambitions will probably be scaled back. Limitations are caused by infrastructure and materiel attrition combined with the lack of an economic basis. The same applies to cooperation within the BRICS framework. Russian authorities have launched several Arctic cooperation initiatives in recent years, but, with the exception of China, these have received a lukewarm response from non-Arctic states.

China and Russia expand their Arctic cooperation
Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic will continue growing, especially while the Ukraine war continues and Western sanctions remain in place. For China, Russia is still central to gaining access to the Arctic, while Russia has few other partners to turn to in order to meet its development targets in the region. 

Joint Sino-Russian investments continue to grow, particularly in the fields of research, energy and infrastructure. The largest cooperation projects are found in the energy sector, especially liquefied natural gas (LNG). The two countries also collaborate on the development of the Northern Sea Route, aiming to increase traffic, expand infrastructure, build polar vessels, train workers and increase the route’s competitiveness compared to other maritime routes. China provides capital and industrial capacity, while Russia has icebreaker expertise and access to natural resources.

China bolsters its polar capability
China is increasing its presence and capability development in both the Arctic and the Antarctic. Beijing aims to strengthen Chinese influence over how the polar regions are managed, and to secure access to strategic sea lanes and natural resources.

In 2025, China operated five research vessels in the Arctic Ocean, an increase from three vessels in 2024 and one in previous years. Additional icebreakers allow for more frequent trips and improve China’s ability to survey the region for civilian and military purposes. China also conducted its first crewed dive to the Arctic seabed.

In the longer term, China is looking to improve its ability to conduct independent military and civilian operations in the polar regions. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) considers the polar regions to be of military-strategic value and want to use technology and skills from both the civilian and military sector to conduct operations there.

Chinese actors are also expected to work towards enhancing the Chinese presence in Svalbard. The archipelago is strategically placed for future shipping routes and polar research, which are central to cementing China’s role as an Arctic actor.

Moreover, the polar regions play a key role in China’s exploitation of space. Beijing is looking to improve access to Arctic infrastructure in order to support the national space programme.