Moscow: Lasting confrontation

No genuine willingness to negotiate while war optimism reigns
The Kremlin has shown no willingness to negotiate, seeking instead to use the negotiations to shift the United States’ approach in its favour.

Western support remains crucial to Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian aggression. The Putin regime believes that Russia is better able to endure war and confrontation than Ukraine and the West, and will therefore continue to make maximalist demands. Despite facing considerable economic challenges, the regime still has means available to continue the war effort.

Sights set on European security architecture
The Kremlin aims to dismantle and then re-establish a world order that aligns with Russia’s great power interests. The regime is preparing for lengthy confrontation, and seeks to deter the West with the means it has available. Dialogue with the United States will be included in the Kremlin’s strategy so long as the regime believes it can gain acceptance for its views. If not, there is an increased chance of more overt use of means, including the threat of nuclear weapons.

Moscow expects its relationship with Europe to continue deteriorating, and is developing new strategic weapons and expanding its armed forces along the border with NATO. Although the Kremlin will still seek to avoid direct military conflict with Europe and NATO, the tense situation heightens the risk of misunderstandings and unintended escalation.

Russian operations in Europe could increase in scope and gravity
Russia is seeking to reduce Western support to Ukraine and undermine European and transatlantic cohesion. Moscow lacks the economic and diplomatic means to influence NATO, making covert means and strategic deterrence all the more important. Russia is operating in grey areas in order to prevent trails from leading back to Moscow. The means used are often referred to as ‘hybrid’, ‘complex’ or ‘covert’. Espionage, sabotage and influence operations are all examples of this, and the Russian intelligence and security services (RISS) play an important role.

Moscow is well aware of the fact that Norway is a major supporter of Ukraine, but usually considers Norway as part of the Western bloc, one of many so-called ‘non-friendly’ Western countries. Russian actors will seize on relevant issues whenever they consider it advantageous, and Norway has certain characteristics which could affect Russian interest. This includes Norwegian proximity to the Arctic and energy supply to Europe as well as the country’s role as a logistics and receiving hub for allied forces. The Kremlin aims to increase Russian scope for action in Svalbard, to influence attitudes to Norwegian defence policy, to instil fear, polarisation and political apathy in the population and to undermine trust in Norwegian authorities – in addition to weakening support to Ukraine.

Following the assault on Ukraine in 2022, there have been reports of several dozen operations in Europe that can be linked to Russia, including arson attacks and vandalism; assassination plots have also been uncovered. Russia will retain an intention to carry out such operations, and the Kremlin is paying close attention to how the West responds to Russian conduct. If security policy relations with Europe were to deteriorate further, Russia would be likely to carry out more frequent and more serious operations.

If Russia were to perceive the war to be less likely to end in its favour, Moscow may become more willing to escalate its use of means against the West. The same could happen if the economy were to take a significant turn for the worse or the regime were to consider itself under threat.

Pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives are being disseminated by Russian actors on digital platforms and in social media, often through channels with covert links to Russian authorities. In recent years, Russian actors have set up websites that claim to be legitimate media platforms with editorial content. It is not always obvious that the content is propaganda; it could also include polarising material intended to spark engagement or divert attention. Dissemination is reinforced by using artificial intelligence, which enables large-scale production of text, images, video and sound in order to increase the statements’ credibility and reach. Examples include fake videos that copy established news organisations and state leaders during European elections, as well as voice cloning of experts and academics. There have also been detected attempts at feeding manipulated information into Western large language models (LLMs), in an effort to have the models respond in line with Russian interests.

European uncertainty advantageous to Russia
Russia considers it advantageous when incidents outside of Ukraine create uncertainty regarding whether they were intentional and controlled by Moscow. Therefore, even unintended incidents could support Russia’s aim of creating uncertainty in European countries regarding Russian motives and capability. A tense political climate combined with Western societies’ tendency towards catastrophising could have a self-reinforcing effect.

Meanwhile, the strained relationship between Russia and the West, combined with low training levels in parts of the Russian armed forces, heightens the risk of unintended incidents and misunderstandings between Russian and allied units. Russia will be paying attention to how Norway and allies handle various incidents; Western responses offer Russian decision-makers insight into military and political matters, which they can use in operational planning and for influence purposes.

Russian drone strikes on targets in western Ukraine carry a persistent risk of drones straying into NATO airspace. Navigation systems could be affected by jamming, weather conditions, faulty programming or technical errors, which could cause drones to miss their intended targets.

At present, most of Russia’s drone production is targeted for use in Ukraine. Russia has been flying drones close to Norway for surveillance purposes for several years, but in very small numbers.

Intelligence threat to remain high
The intelligence threat from Russian services will remain considerable in 2026. Norwegian targets are constantly subjected to intelligence operations. For information gathering, Russia relies heavily on cyber operations, civilian ship crews and proxies without formal links to Russian authorities. Weapons deliveries to Ukraine, training of Ukrainian personnel, allied presence, government targets, critical infrastructure and Norwegian defensive capability will all remain topics of interest in Russian intelligence operations.

The NATO exercise Cold Response, which is staged in March, is one of the most important annual activities for the Norwegian Armed Forces in Norway. Russia will monitor the exercise and gather information in order to detect any changes to NATO’s structure and plans. In Norwegian waters, Russia uses military intelligence vessels and aircraft, as well as covert intelligence collection, including by non-military vessels. Despite strained resources, the Russian navy will allocate vessels to demonstrating Russian presence during major NATO exercises. These demonstrations could take place either locally or in close proximity to the exercise.

Military measures serve both economic and military interests 
After the West introduced more rigorous checks of shadow fleet vessels in 2025, Russia took steps to secure and escort them through the Baltic Sea. This mission continues in 2026 and lays claim to several naval vessels, but is important to keeping Russia’s war economy going.

Ukraine’s ability to use drones to hit targets deep inside Russian territory has increased since 2022. Russia has taken protective measures, including by disrupting GNSS signals around Russian infrastructure. Since 2022, GNSS disruptions have been registered regularly off the Kola Peninsula, and have increased in scope following Ukraine’s drone strikes on Olenegorsk in 2024. The systems used have long range and are causing disruptions in Norwegian airspace as well. These measures are expected to remain in place.

In addition, Ukrainian attacks on Russian areas far from the front line have prompted Russia to avoid gathering several military systems in one place. In 2025, Moscow announced that Navy Day celebrations would be scaled back considerably, despite this being an important celebration in Russia.

Political and economic development
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Enemy perception and threats of repercussions aim to pacify the public
Being seen as the losing side in the Ukraine war is not an option for the Kremlin. The war has been touted as a ‘rescue operation’, and Moscow has linked it to the victory over the Nazis in the Second World War, an event which is central to Russian identity construction. Meanwhile, the war is depleting Russian resources, which necessitates cost-cutting at home. It is therefore becoming increasingly important for the Kremlin to prevent poor living conditions from fomenting discontent which in turn could trigger protests. Russian regime stability is consequently closely linked to the outcome of the war in Ukraine and the confrontation with the West.

Through the war years, the Kremlin has continued centralising power and tightening its control of both the elites and the population at large, through systematic and ruthless repression of any and all opposition. While the majority of those who enlist for the war, as well as those working in the Russian defence industry, are seeing their wages rise, a growing proportion of Russians are feeling the effects of the war; war-weariness is widespread. In the Murmansk region, the impact of the war comes on top of long-standing problems caused by dilapidated buildings, frequent heating and hot water outages in winter, a shrinking population and budget deficits.

As these developments unfold, the Kremlin is seeking to change the so-called ‘social contract’. The regime is no longer capable of offering its citizens steadily rising living standards in exchange for them eschewing political activity. To compensate for this, the Kremlin has reinforced the narrative that Western forces are undermining Russia. This enemy perception is meant to have a unifying effect while simultaneously casting aspersions on the opposition and cutting off its connections to Western support.

The regime has threatened powerful retribution against individuals and groups that do not toe the line. In March 2022, a new article was added to Russia’s public administration act regarding public actions that ‘discredit’ the Russian armed forces. Since then, vast numbers of police inquiries have been opened into statements regarding the Ukraine war.

Such repressive legislation has been introduced and tightened for years, and offers the authorities legal instruments with which to pursue their opponents. Journalists, opposition politicians and anyone who dares to raise their voice are labelled ‘foreign agents’, ‘extremists’ or ‘terrorists’. For example, in November 2025 the Russian supreme court declared the Anti-Corruption Fund (FBK) set up by the late Aleksey Navalny a ’terrorist organisation’.

This strategy has so far proved effective at preventing and managing incipient social unrest. Domestic political pressure sufficient to prompt the regime to alter its course is unlikely in 2026. The elites will remain loyal, and the population will lack both the ability and the will to make organised resistance.

Bleaker views on Norway in Russian society
From Moscow’s perspective, there is little to distinguish Norway from the rest of the Western bloc. The regime’s control of information and its targeted use of propaganda and indoctrination help shape Russian thinking in a way which deviates more and more from Norway and the West’s perception of reality. This applies to Russians in all walks of life.

Economy to remain vulnerable
Russia remains in recession and from an economic standpoint, 2026 is likely to be the most difficult year since the assault on Ukraine in 2022. The priority given to the war is depleting Russian resources. Production of military materiel and incentives for recruiting soldiers help preserve military capability, but come at the expense of the economy and workforces in other sectors. Tensions within the government apparatus are therefore expected to rise.

The regime is manipulating economic data in order to paint a rosier picture, but also has other means at its disposal to ameliorate the current problems, such as reallocating funds from the civilian sector to military purposes, raising taxes, issuing and forcing the purchase of government bonds and sanctions circumvention. Although these instruments offer flexibility in terms of keeping the economy seemingly afloat, in reality the economy is extremely vulnerable, especially to fluctuations in oil prices and Western sanctions.

Military developments
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From Moscow’s perspective, the threat environment has worsened and the risk of a new regional war has increased due to the war in Ukraine. The Russian land forces are therefore expected to continue expanding in the years ahead. The strategic deterrence forces will remain the bedrock of Russian security policy, and the Northern Fleet will retain its key role in Russian nuclear and conventional deterrence and in its strategic communication towards NATO. Moreover, the testing of new and sophisticated weapons systems in areas close to Norway will continue.

Land power growing steadily
Despite its strained economy, Russia will continue prioritising production and recruitment, both to maintain combat power in Ukraine and to expand the land force structure. Russia’s strategic stockpiles are depleting, and the land power will increasingly have to rely on new production. Heavy materiel is less exposed now than it was earlier in the war, and the rate of loss has come down. Russian personnel losses will remain substantial, but both production and recruitment will continue to exceed losses on the battlefield. 

The war in Ukraine has evolved into a relatively static war of attrition. Unmanned systems have gained far more importance, and the two parties’ ability to manoeuvre using mechanised forces on the battlefield is very limited. For now, all indications suggest that Russian military doctrine remains unchanged, and that Russia will seek to settle any future armed conflict as quickly as possible. Particularly against a conventionally superior adversary, Russia will seek to prevent the conflict from developing into a lengthy war of attrition. Although new technology and experiences from the war in Ukraine have raised the importance of defensive land-based operations, Russian land forces will continue to be postured for offensive, manoeuvre-based warfare, with main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and artillery the core materiel. This is reflected in Russia’s continued prioritisation of the production of heavier land based military equipment. That being said, unmanned systems, long-range precision-guided fire and electronic warfare systems are set to play a more important role in Russia’s future land power.

The Northern Fleet’s role remains unchanged
The Northern Fleet secures Russia’s important northern flank, and its primary task is to ensure a credible deterrent by protecting the fleet’s own strategic submarines. Additionally, it provides deterrence through other capabilities, including missile-carrying surface combatants and submarines that are capable of threatening military and civilian targets in NATO countries as well as NATO’s maritime supply routes. The fleet also assists the Baltic Fleet in escorting shadow fleet vessels that carry Russian oil and gas.

The Northern Fleet’s strategic submarines and cruise missile-carrying multirole submarines maintain a presence close to Norwegian borders. Regular deployments to the Atlantic Ocean are a priority.

A maintenance backlog will continue to limit the Russian navy’s combat power. The gap between mission numbers and available resources is widening. The exception thus far has been the most advanced submarines; they have been shielded and are able to maintain a high operational tempo.

The modernisation of the Northern Fleet is progressing slowly. More naval platforms are being armed with modern long-range precision-guided weapons. Over the course of 2026, the Northern Fleet will come to have three Severodvinsk-class multirole submarines and three frigates available, all carrying hypersonic Tsirkon missiles. The Kirov II-class cruiser Admiral Nakhimov has undergone modernisation and will become the Russian navy’s new flagship. Armed with both Kalibr and Tsirkon missiles, she will be extremely powerful. She will continue sea trials and weapons testing throughout 2026, and may be ready for active service towards the end of the year. The Northern Fleet is also expected to receive one modernised Akula I-class attack submarine and six conventional Kilo II-class submarines in the years ahead, all armed with Kalibr missiles.

Ability to attack critical undersea infrastructure evolving
Russia continues developing its military capability to attack Western critical deep-sea infrastructure. Shallow-water infrastructure is vulnerable to both intended destruction and unintended damage by anchors and trawls. The deeper the target is located, the more complex sabotage becomes. Operations at depths of several hundred metres require vast resources and careful planning. Much of Norway’s critical infrastructure is located in deep water.

Russia’s Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research, or GUGI for short, has surface vessels tailored to mapping Western undersea infrastructure, and submarines purpose-built to destroy infrastructure. The offensive capability provided by these special-purpose submarines is found only on the Kola Peninsula.

Testing of advanced weapons in the High North continues
Russia will continue developing new weapons and improving existing systems, with the aim of enhancing range, precision and penetrability in the face of jamming and other countermeasures. High priority is given to submarines, long-range missiles and attack drones. Russia will continue research and development on anti-satellite weapons, strategic intercontinental weapons, strategic air defence, missile defence and long-range precision-guided weapons. Several of these systems will be tested in the High North in 2026.
 

The war in Ukraine
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No willingness to compromise despite marginal progress
As long as the Kremlin believes it retains the military advantage, it sees no reason to make concessions or compromises in the war against Ukraine. Russia is exerting sustained pressure on Ukrainian lines of defence. It continues making limited territorial progress along the front, primarily in central parts of eastern Ukraine and in Donetsk oblast.

Generally speaking, Russian progress is nevertheless marginal. In 2025, Ukraine lost only 0.8 per cent of its lawful territory. In 2024, the figure was 0.6 per cent. In the areas that the Kremlin has politically annexed, Ukraine still controls just shy of 20,000 square kilometres.

Russia has lost close to 1,100,000 soldiers since 24 February 2022; this figure includes those killed, wounded, missing and taken prisoner of war. Around half of these will never return to the battlefield. Russia has also lost more than 13,000 armoured vehicles. However, it remains able to recruit personnel and upholding materiel production. Barring any significant changes off the battlefield, the relative strength will therefore continue shifting in Russia’s favour.

In addition, Russia continues making extensive use of one-way attack drones. In 2025, Russia used more than four times as many drones as the year before. Since the summer of 2025, more than 5,000 attack drones have been launched against Ukrainian territory every month. This puts enormous strain on Ukraine’s armed forces and the population.

Russia is expected to continue making limited progress along the front throughout 2026. Meanwhile, both sides will continue attacking critical civilian infrastructure and military targets in each other’s rear areas.

Ukraine’s defensive capability still dependent on Western support
Ukraine has fewer soldiers than Russia along the front. Recruitment drives over the past year have not fully succeeded. Dependence on Western support makes it difficult for Ukraine to draw up long-term operational plans and coordinate a unified defence strategy.

Ukraine has established deep defences and is using drones to compensate for its inferiority in terms of personnel and materiel. However, the battlespace close to the front is complex, with intense fighting over heavily fortified cities in Donetsk. The presence of surveillance drones makes surprise and re-supply very challenging for both sides, and has enabled Ukraine to stem Russian progress so far. For its part, Russia has demonstrated an inability to concentrate forces and to coordinate and exploit the smaller breakthroughs it has achieved. It is therefore highly unlikely that Russia will succeed in converting its force superiority into major progress in the months ahead.

Ukraine has succeeded in using innovation and different parts of society in its defensive struggle. Its warfighting has been adapted along the way, and Ukraine’s ability to target Russian rear areas and conduct sophisticated operations has improved through four years of defensive war. Nevertheless, Ukraine relies on Western support to avoid losing the war. The West plays a key role for Ukrainian combat power, with financial and political support as well as direct military donations. Although Ukraine’s own production of military materiel has increased, the industry still relies on Western funding and access to electricity. If the West continues its support, Ukraine’s production capacity is likely to continue growing, enabling the country to defend its own territory. In the longer term, Western support will be important to enable Ukraine to increase the impact of attacks on strategic Russian targets. The most critical requirements are air defence, artillery shells and long-range precision-guided weapons.